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SOME PROBLEMS OF REMOVAL AND APPEAL
FROM COURTS NOT OF RECORD IN VIRGINIA'
HARMON D. MAXSON
I. Removal
A. General
Virginia statutes governing removal of a case from a court
not of record merely outline procedure already in effect2 .
The purpose of the statutes is not stated. A defendant may
remove a case without stating cause or reason. Removal from
courts not of record is limited to civil cases.
In practice, the defendant may find removal an important
bit of strategy in various situations. Advantages of removal in-
clude benefits of a jury trial allowed in courts of record but
not available in courts not of record, and foreclosure of the
I As provided by Va. Code § 16.1-5 (1950) "Courts not of record," unless
otherwise specifically provided, shall mean and include all courts in
the Commonwealth below the jurisdictional level of the circuit and
corporation courts. "County courts" are a specific type of court not of
record, and include all courts in counties heretofore designated as trial
justice courts and county courts. All existing courts in cities and towns
created under former § 16-129, and all similar courts created under the
provisions of municipal charters, which courts are presided over by
mayors, justices of the peace, police justices or other trial officers how-
ever designated and the jurisdiction of which is limited to cases involving
violations of city or town ordinances or of cases instituted for collection
of city or town taxes or assessments or other debts due and owing to
such city or town, are known as police courts. Unless otherwise specifically
provided, police courts are not included in the designation "courts not
of record." (Va. Code, § 16.1-70 (1950). Juvenile and Domestic Re-
lations courts as covered by Va. Code §§ 16.1-139 through 16.1-217
are not treated in this paper. It should be noted however that these
courts generally exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over matters
within their purvue (§ 16.1-158). Such matters may be appealed but
may not be removed.
2 Va. Code, §§ 16.1-72, 16.1-92, 16.1-105 and 16.1-22 (1950). Removal
under these sections is not to be confused with change of venue or
removal for avoidance of prejudice provided for by Va. Code §§ 8-38(10),
8-157, 8-158 and 8-159 (1950). In the former series of statutes removal
is to a court which might have had appellate jurisdiction over the case
while in the latter, removal is to a court of similar jurisdiction. In addi-
tion, the latter govern removal from circuit, city or corporation courts,
whereas the former are restricted to "courts not of record."
probability of an appeal. In this respect, the procedure tends
to expedite justice by avoiding two trials where one will suffice.
When the defendant has a good defense but feels he may lose
in the lower courts, he may save himself the cost of an appeal
(including expense of bond required on appeal but not on re-
moval) by removing the case.
The defendant may wish to remove a case in order not to
reveal his strategy in the lower court and thus preclude the
likelihood of an appeal by the plaintiff. Such tactics may be
especially effective in cases involving contracts which provide
for voluntary arbitration but which have not been arbitrated
at the time the original suit is filed. Where the plaintiff bases
his appeal on subsequent arbitration the odds are likely to swing
in his favor. The defendant may often preclude this by re-
moving the case beforehand. Cost of appeal from a court of
record includes cost of printing the record. Since this seldom
is less than $1,000, it often amounts to a prohibitive sum,
making such appeal much less likely than from a court not of
record.
Removal may also be advantageous where a party is de-
fendant to two similar actions brought at the same time. If the
defendant loses the first case he may wish to appeal it and
remove the second case so they may be tried together in the
circuit court. The danger in such procedure lies in the fact that
should the appeal be denied3, the purpose for removal is de-
feated. Although an appeal may sometimes be withdrawn,
no such statutory provision has been enacted for withdrawing
a removal action. This danger is somewhat ameliorated in some
localities, however, where in practice, the clerk of the court
of record, acting in behalf of the judge, grants such withdrawal.
Removal from a court not of record does not preclude sub-
sequent appeal from the court of record to which it was re-
moved. The nature of an appeal from a court of record differs
from that of a court not of record, however, and the advantages
are to some extent lost. Not only are the costs of the former
3 An appeal may be denied for failure to meet any of the requirements of
paragraphs B. 1 and 2, C and D of Section II of this paper.
greater, but appeal from a court not of record is an "appeal de
novo"4 whereas appeal from a court of record is not.
Today, removal of an action from one court to another is
entirely statutory. In the face of some demand for the elimina-
tion of all provisions for removal from a court not of record,
broad powers have been granted courts of record to approve
the removal of and to try removed civil cases5. In such cases,
the court may permit all necessary amendments, enter such
orders, and direct such proceedings as may be necessary or
proper to correct any defects, irregularities and omissions in the
pleadings, and bring about a fair trial on the merits of the
controversy'.
B. Jurisdiction
1. Subject Matter
a. Land-Virginia courts not of record lack jurisdiction
to try cases involving title to realty. Section 16.1-77 (2) ' which
gives civil jurisdiction to courts not of record to try attachment
cases should be amended to reflect this limitation. This section
is presently in conflict with section 16.1-105 which correctly
states the law8 . Thus a court not of record shall take no cog-
nizance of attachment cases levied upon real estate, but shall
forthwith remove such cases to a court of record having juris-
diction, to be further proceeded with in such court as if the
attachments had originated therein'.
2. Amount
a. General - in order to remove an action from courts not
of record, the amount in controversy must exceed three hundred
4Va. Code, § 16.1-136 (Supp. 1958).
5 Senate Document No. 12, Comm. of Va., p. 44 (1956).
6 Va. Code, § 16.1-92 (1950).
7 From this point on in this paper such references will be to the Va. Code(1950).
8 Cf. section II, B. 1. a. of this paper for opposite result in cases appealed.
9 Va. Code, § 16.1-105 (1950).
dollars, exclusive of interest, attorneys' fees and costs'". This
figure is a full third increase over the amount previously re-
quired. The change reflects the lessened value of the dollar as
well as an attempt to discourage use of removal as a delaying
tactic only". It also serves to reduce the volume of cases tried
in courts of record.
b. Amount of Cross-claim - In theory, the defendant re-
moving an action from a court not of record has not submitted
to the jurisdiction thereof. He has not chosen the court not of
record as the tribunal in which to assert his claim. Not having
invoked the jurisdiction of the court not of record, the de-
fendant's claim on removal is not limited to the jurisdictional
amount of that court. Upon perfection of the removal, the case
is tried in the court to which removed just as though it had been
brought there in the first instance and the limitations upon the
jurisdiction of the lower court are disregarded. The Supreme
Court of Appeals reached this conclusion in Hoffman v. Stuart'
where the plaintiffs brought an action in a court not of record
for six hundred and nineteen dollars for damages to their truck,
resulting from a collision with the auto of the defendant's
decedent. Defendants, who were administrators of the estate,
removed the cause to the circuit court and there filed a cross-
claim for fifteen thousand dollars, alleging the wrongful death
of the decedent as a result of the same collision. The cross-
claim was allowed even though it was in excess of the jurisdic-
tional amount of the lower court'. (The same result should
follow even though the plaintiff's original claim be less than
three hundred dollars.)
It is in respect to such liberality in amount of cross-claim
based on the theory of the jurisdiction of the trial court not
10Va. Code, § 16.1-92 (1950). Note: An action may be removed from a
court of limited jurisdiction (e. g., police courts referred to in footnote
1.) when the amount exceeds fifty dollars: Va. Code, § 16.1-72 (1950).
11 Senate Document, No. 12, Comm. of Va., p. 44 (1956).
12 188 Va. 785, 51 S.E.2d 239 (1949).
'
3 Va. Code, § 16.1-77 (1950) gives courts not of record exclusive juris-
diction in certain civil matters not exceeding three hundred dollars and
concurrent jurisdiction with courts of record where amounts involved
do not exceed two thousand dollars.
having been invoked, that removal procedure most differs from
appeal. As we shall see, a very different rule applies to appeals 4.
On principle where the case is removed, the plaintiff should
likewise be permitted to amend his claim to an amount in excess
of such limit.
C. Removal Requirements
Removal may be had any time on or before the return day
of process or within ten days after such return" day, if trial of
the case has not commenced or if judgment has not been
rendered 5 .
Any defendant may request removal by the judge of the
court not of record. However, in order to make certain that the
bona fides are present, and that removal is not used merely as
a delaying tactic, the defendant must file an application for
removal (a letter application sufficies) as well as an affidavit
that he has a substantial cause of action. In addition, he must
pay the costs accrued to the time of removal, the writ tax, and
the costs in the court to which removed' 6 . Although there is
no statutory provision for withdrawing a removal action, the
clerk of the court of record sometimes grants such withdrawal
whether or not the withdrawal is requested within the original
ten-day period. If the defendant fails to meet any of the removal
stipulations, the judge shall refuse to grant removal and shall
proceed to try the case'.
D. Trial of Removal Cases
Trial procedure in courts of record follows as nearly as pos-
sible the Rules of Court for other actions at law (Rules 3:3
through 3:22) with liberal discretionary powers in the court
of record to permit all necessary amendments, enter such orders,
14 See section II. A.
15 Va. Code, § 16.1-92 (1950).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
and direct such proceedings as may be necessary or proper to
correct any defects, irregularities and omissions in the pleadings
and bring about a trial on the merits of the controversy"8 .
II. Appeal
A. General
The remedy of appeal in actions of law and in equity is
purely of constitutional' or statutory2" origin. Unlike removal,
appeal is not limited to civil cases. When found in a statute at
the present time, the meaning to be given to "appeal" must be
gathered from the language of the statute itself in the light of
the context"1 .
An appeal is a direct attack on the judgment or order ap-
pealed from, and a challenge of the binding force of the judg-
ment of the trial court. In the absence of some statutory or
constitutional provisions, the right of appeal is a matter of
privilege rather than a natural, inherent, or vested right. How-
ever, when provided for by statute or constitution, it becomes
a matter of right and should not be denied except for good
cause. Nor should it be denied on technical grounds if appellant
is acting in good faith. The Virginia Code provides for very
liberal correction of defective or irregular warrants or motions
in civil appeals22 . Similar provisions for criminal cases have
not yet been provided. There is an urgent need for such legis-
lation and in particular for a provision allowing amendment
of the record on appeal of criminal cases.
An appeal from a court not of record is in effect a statutory
grant of a new trial23. The true rule is that while the appeal
18 Va. Code, § 16.1-92 (1950). See further Va. Code, § 16.1-114 (1950).
19 Constitution of Va., §§ 88 et. seq.
20Va. Code, §§ 8-462 et. seq., 16.1-73, 16.1-106 through 114, 16.1-122,
16.1-132 through 134, 16.1-214 through 216 (1950).
21 Widgins v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 142 Va. 419, 128 S.F. 516, 518 (1925).
22 Va. Code, § 16.1-114 (1950).
23 Baylor v. Comm., 190 Va. 116, 56 S.F.2d 77 (1949).
is heard and determined de novo24 insofar as the receipt of
evidence and the amendment and supplementation of pleadings
is concerned, yet for the purpose of jurisdiction the proceeding
on appeal is but a continuation of the original proceeding be-
fore the trial judge2".
B. Jurisdiction
1. Subject Matter
a. Land - As stated in the removal section of this paper,
Virginia courts not of record have no jurisdiction to try cases
involving title to realty. Under such circumstances it is re-
versable error to allow an appeal to a circuit court in a case
involving petition for attachment of property26 . The reasoning
is that in cases of appeal, the jurisdiction of the circuit court is
derivative of that of the court not of record and where the
latter has no jurisdiction, neither does the circuit court. This
reasoning appears to be a complete quibble in view of the fact
that lack of jurisdiction in the lower court is the basis for re-
moving such attachment cases therefrom to the circuit court.
b. Persons - Section 16.1-77 grants courts not of record
original jurisdiction to try cases involving injury to the person
where the amount does not exceed three hundred dollars, and
concurrent jurisdiction with courts of record having jurisdiction
in such territory when the amount exceeds three hundred dol-
lars but does not exceed two thousand dollars. In Fuller v.
Edwards", it was held that a defamation suit is a suit for per-
sonal injuries within the meaning of the then existing counter-
part of this statute and since a court not of record has authority
to try it within these monetary limitations, it may likewise be
appealed.
24 Wygal v. Wilder, 117 Va. 896, 86 S.E. 97 (1915); Gravely v. Deeds,
185 Va. 662, 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946); Copperthite Pie Corp. v. Whitehurst,
157 Va. 480, 162 S.E. 189 (1932).
25 See Section II.B.2.b. of this paper for the development of and comment
on this rule.
26 Addison v. Salyer, 185 Va. 644, 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946).
27 180 Va. 191, 22 S.E.2d 26 (1942).
2. Amount
a. General - Appeal may be had as a matter of right
from any order or judgment rendered in a court not of record
in a civil case in which the matter in controversy is greater than
fifty dollars, exclusive of interest, attorney's fees contracted for
in the instrument, and costs2".
b. Amount of Amended Claim and Cross-Claim or Set-Off
Section 16.1-114 provides that actions or proceedings ap-
pealed or removed from courts not of record shall be tried ac-
cording to the principles of law and equity. In Cooperthite Pie
Corporation v. Whitehurst, decided under a similar provision,
set-off was authorized under the well established principles of
equity 9. The court reasoned that as statutes permit justices of
the peace to hear and determine set-offs, it follows as a matter
of course that on an appeal to a court of record, where greater
latitude is expressly permitted, a set-off may be filed. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court relied in part on section 6030
of the Code of 1919 which is essentially reproduced by section
16.1-113 of the present Code as follows: "All legal evidence
produced by either party shall be heard whether the same was
produced or not before the court from which the appeal is
taken."
The decision gave birth to the rule that the jurisdiction of
the circuit court is derivative of and limited by that of the court
not of record with the collateral result that although the right
to set-off is established, it is limited in maximum amount to
the area of concurrent jurisdiction between courts of record
and courts not of record. (At present, section 16.1-77 has
established this concurrent jurisdiction at two thousand dollars.)
The holding was in part based on the premise that since a
justice of the peace has limited jurisdiction derived entirely
from statute, he can only exercise such jurisdiction as is express-
28 Va. Code, § 16.1-106 (1950). Sections 16.1-103 and 16.1-123 of Va.
Code (1950) similarly provide respectively for appeal where fifty dollars
or more is involved in connection with interrogatories in aid of execution
in connection with proceedings to try title to property levied on under
distress or execution.
29 157 Va. 580, 162 S.F. 189 (1932).
ly conferred upon him3". This limitation carries through to the
jurisdiction of the county judge which historically is derivative
of that of the trial justice3 just as the jurisdiction of the latter
was historically derivative of that of the justice of the peace3".
In Stacy v. Mullins33 , the court extended this rule to hold
that an appeal of a civil action from a court not of record a
plaintiff may not, in the circuit court, amend his complaint to
claim an amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial justice.
The court cited the Copperthite case and numerous cases from
other states holding that an appeal is a mere continuation of the
original case - a proceeding in the same action. The court
quoted dicta to the effect that want of jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter in the court where the action was brought, continues
in every court where the action may be appealed, for the reasons
that it is the same action, and an appeal is authorized only where
the court from which the appeal is taken, in case of the failure
to appeal, would have had authority to enforce its judgment.
Therefore, jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to the
highest sum which the court from which the appeal was taken
was authorized to render judgment. Thus, the court in deciding
this landmark case, imposed a serious and lasting limitation on
the de novo nature of an appeal from a court not of record.
The egregiousness of those two decisions and of their re-
sultant rule is as lamentable as the penumbra of specious reason-
ing which foreshadowed them. The following example is fur-
ther illustrative of the difficulty an attorney may encounter
under this rule. In a detinue action for nine hogs34, judgment
was given for the plaintiff and defendant appealed to the
circuit court. During the county court trial it became ap-
parent that this would have been a proper case to have
3 0 Wall v. American Bank, etc. Co., 159 Va. 871, 167 S.E. 425 (1933);
Martin v. City of Richmond, 108 Va. 765, 62 S.E. 800 (1908); Richmond
v. Sutherland, 114 Va. 688, 77 S.E. 470 (1913).
31 42 VLR 1032, A New Law for Courts Not of Record (1956).
32 Dotson v. Dickerson, 169 Va. 50, 192 S.E. 700 (1937).
33 185 Va. 837, 40 S.E.2d 265 (1946).
3 4 Tucker v. Baughm presently being appealed from the Southampton County
Court, Southampton, Va.
sought punitive damages. Such damages however do not
ordinarily lie in a detinue case. On appeal counsel for plain-
tiff wishes to take a voluntary non-suit in the circuit court
followed by a motion for judgment for conversion of the
hogs, asking damages for their value plus punitive damages.
Section 8-220 provides that a party shall not be allowed to
suffer a non-suit unless he do so before the jury retire from
the bar or before the suit or action has been submitted to the
court for decision before a motion to strike the evidence has
been sustained by the court. The question arises whether the
former adjudication is a bar to non-suit on appeal - the
answer should clearly be No. Since the trial de novo effect of
such appeal is to abrogate the lower court judgment, a non-
suit may be taken on appeal before the action has been sub-
mitted to the circuit court for decision. The question remains
however as to the extent of total damages which may be
awarded. Under the limitations imposed by Stacy v. Mullins,
the maximum allowable is two thousand dollars, which likely
will be very little more than the actual value of nine hogs".
c. When Amount Immaterial-In civil cases, involving
the constitutionality or validity of a Virginia statute or of a
municipal ordinance or by-law, there shall be an appeal of
right, irrespective of the amount of the matter in controversy3".
Similarly, in criminal cases any person convicted of an
offense not felonious shall have the right of appeal. There
shall also be an appeal of right from any order or judgment
of a court not of record forfeiting any recognizance or revok-
ing any suspension of sentence" .
3. Law--Equity Problem
In Addison v. Salyer3" it was held that cases heard on ap-
peal from a court not of record cannot be transferred from
35 Va. Code, § 16.1-106 (1950).
36 Va. Code, § 16.1-132 (1950).
37 185 Va. 644, 40 S.E.2d 260 (1948). Applied in Copperthite Pie Corp. v.
Whitehurst, 157 Va. 480, 162 S.X. 189 (1932); Gemmel v. Svea Fire
etc. Ins. Co., 166 Va. 95, 184 S.F. 457 (1936); Virginia Machinery
etc. Co. v. Hungerford Coal Co., 182 Va. 550, 29 S.X.2d 359 (1944).
38 185 Va. 644, 40 SE.2d 260 (1946).
law to equity or visa versa as this is inconsistent with sections
16.1-113 and 16.1-114 which expressly declare that every
appeal shall be tried by the court in a summary way, that all
legal evidence produced by either party shall be heard, whether
the same was produced or not before the trial court and that
every such appeal shall be determined according to the prin-
ciples of law and equity. The transfer provisions of section
8-138 thus have no application in a case appealed from a county
court. In theory, however, the same beneficial result should
be reached since section 16.1-114 further provides that when
the principles of law and equity conflict, the principles of equity
shall prevail. This section is designed to provide liberal cor-
rection of any defect or irregularity to the end that justice be
not delayed or denied by reason of errors in the pleadings or
in the form of the proceedings.
4. Effect of Original Jarisdiction on the Power to
Remand
In a criminal proceeding the defendant was convicted be-
fore a court not of record and appealed to the circuit court" .
The circuit court found the warrant defective and remanded
the case to the lower tribunal. This was reversable error. In
cases of this sort the circuit court is exercising original juris-
diction and has no power to remand a case. This might be
better explained by saying that once an appeal is perfected the
court not of record is bereft of jurisdiction and it is as if there
is no lower tribunal to which the case may be remanded. It is
the duty of the circuit court to amend the warrant so as to
remedy the defect, to try the case, and to pronounce judgment
as if the case had originated in that court.
The same principle should apply in civil cases. Thus in a
garnishment case appealed by the defendant to the circuit
court, a motion by the plaintiff to dismiss and remand because
of defect in the bond, is clearly improper. Not only is it not
within the power of the circuit court to remand, but in essence
dismissal and remand are inimical. A dismissal of a perfected
appeal leaves the parties in the same position as though the
39 Mailouf v. City of Roanoke, 177 Va. 846, 13 S.E.2d 319 (1941).
original action had never been brought whereas a remand, if
allowed, would serve to reopen the action in the court not of
record.
C. Time for Appeal and Withdrawal of Appeal
In both civil and criminal cases, appeal must be made with-
in ten days after the order, judgment or conviction appealed4 .
Time extensions are governed by Rule 3:13. in criminal cases
under section 16.1-133 any person convicted in a court of
record of an offense not felonious may within ten days after
such conviction, withdraw an appeal which has been noted,
pay the fine and costs to such court, and serve any sentence
which has been imposed.
Payment of a fine, however, is not per se a waiver of the
right to appeal. In Gravely v. Deeds41 the defendant was con-
victed of a misdemeanor, fined and sentenced to twelve months
in jail. He paid his fine at once and sought to appeal to the
circuit court five days later. In granting the appeal, the court
conceded that since a man tried for a misdemeanor may not
consult a lawyer until after conviction, he should have the full
ten days to decide whether to appeal.
The appeal is perfected when entered on the appeal docket.
The appellant has thirty days from the date of judgment in
which to perfect the appeal. In order to perfect an appeal, all
requirements for bond and surety must be met. In addition,
within thirty days from the date of the judgment, the appellant
must pay the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken,
the amount of the writ tax and costs as required by subsection
(59) of section 14-12342.
40 Va. Code, §§ 16.1-106 and 16.1-132 (1950).
41185 Va. 662, 40 SXE.2d 175 (1946).
42 A ten dollar derk's fee, or five dollars in actions not involving more than
five hundred dollars.
D. Requirement of Bond and Surety
1. Civil Cases
Statutory requirements for appeal bonds have always been
construed as mandatory". Section 16.1-107 provides that no
appeal shall be allowed unless and until the party or someone
for him shall give bond, in an amount and with sufficient
surety approved by the judge or by his clerk, to abide by such
judgment as may be rendered on appeal, if such appeal be per-
fected, or if not perfected, then to satisfy the judgment of the
court in which it was rendered. The exact meaning of "surety"
is not clear from the context of the statute. It is apparently
used with the same connotation as "security". The former
statute44 containing the same ambiguity, was interpreted to
mean that the terms should not be looked on as synonmous,
and that a deposit of cash or a certified check was not "surety"
within the meaning of the statute45. In other words surety
means a person, bonding company, etc. who is willing to act
as surety in the accepted suretyship sense. This is obviously
the better view and is substantiated by section 16.1-110 which
provides that the surety in an appeal bond shall not be re-
leased by the appellant's being adjudicated a bankrupt at any
time subsequent to the judgment rendered in the court not of
record.
That the word "surety" when found in present statutes
should be given its ordinary meaning is further indicated by
section 16.1-113 which provides that if a judgment be re-
covered by the appellee, execution shall issue against the prin-
cipal and his surety, jointly or separately for the amount of
the judgment and the execution shall be endorsed "No security
is to be taken."
The words "sufficient surety" in section 16.1-107 leave the
entire matter of surety to the discretion of the judge of the
court not of record, and leave the way open to the interpreta-
43 Covington Virginian v. Woods, 182 Va. 538, 29 S.E.2d 406 (1944).
44 Va. Code, § 16-28 (1950).
45 Brooks v. Epperson, 164 Va. 37, 178 S.E. 787 (1935).
tion that furnishing surety is optional rather than mandatory.
Under present law a judge may, within his own discretion,
decide that "sufficient surety" means no surety at all.
The provision of former section 16-28 for verbal acknowl-
edgment of surety has been eliminated by section 16.1-107.
Section 16.1-108 does provide that money may be deposited
in lieu of bond.
Section 16.1-107 provides that if bond is furnished by or
on behalf of any party against whom judgment has been
rendered for money or property or both, the bond shall be
conditioned for the performance and satisfaction of such judg-
ment or order as may be entered against such party on appeal
for the payment of all costs and damages which may be awarded
against him in the appellate court. If the appeal is by a party
against whom there is no recovery except for costs, the bond
shall be conditioned for the payment of such costs and dam-
ages as may be awarded against him on appeal.
For bonding purposes, an appeal from a court not of
record is a continuation of the same suit, so that the liability
of the obligor on a detinue bond continues until the appeal is
decided. Similarly the liability of a surety continues when a
continuance is granted upon appeal. However, because of the
de novo nature of an appeal from a court not of record, acts
of a judge, subsequent to the first approval, disapproving the
appeal bond, are ineffective.
Corporations appealing from courts not of record must
affix the corporate seal to the appeal bond. In The Covington
Virginian, Inc. v. Woods4", the defendant corporation lost its
case before a trial justice and appealed. The plaintiff asked the
appellate court for a continuance. Later upon noticing that
46 182 Va. 538, 29 S.E.2d 406 (1944). Absence of corporate seal on a
corporate bond was also used as grounds to attack the appeal in Noland
Co. Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. presently pending appellate
trial in the Circuit Court of James City County, Va. In this case the
bond, which was signed by the attorneys for the principal and surety
(American Casualty Co.), bore the printed word SEAL after each
signature. In addition the corporate seal of the surety had been affixed
and the principal's attorney had made his own personal scroll as a seal.
the appeal bond did not bear a seal, the plaintiff moved for
and secured a dismissal of the appeal. It was held that if a
certified check is not good as a bond, when the statute requires
a bond, an unsealed instrument is likewise unsatisfactory. Since
the ten day limit for perfection of appeal had gone by when
the plaintiff asked for a continuance, the error could not have
been corrected by a prompt objection, and there was no implied
waiver on the plaintiff's part.
It should be noted that under the Model Business Corpora-
tions Act mandatory use of the corporate seal is abolished as
an unnecessary and obsolete requirement. Its use is made per-
missive because of the conveyancing acts in many states. Sec-
tions 13.1-3 (c) and 13.1-20 indicate that general use of the
corporate seal is permissive and not mandatory. The Rules of
Court contain no requirement for corporate seal. It would
seem that in the interest of streamlining legal procedure and
in accordance with the tenure of the Virginia Code, that it is
time to declare that use of the corporate seal is no longer
mandatory in Virginia.
When a court not of record fails to require an appeal bond,
it is the duty of the circuit court to correct the omission and
upon due execution of the bond, to proceed to try the case4" .
Under section 16.1-109 the court to which the appeal is
taken may require the appellant to give new or additional
security with penalty of dismissal with costs for failure to so
provide.
Section 16.1-107 provides that when appeal is proper to
protect the estate of a decedent, an infant, a convict, an insane
person, or the interest of a county, city or town, no bond shall
be required.
2. Criminal Cases
There is no statutory provision for bond per se for criminal
cases appealed from courts not of record. Section 16.1-135
47 Jenkins v. Betrarn. 163 Va. 672, 177 S.F. 204 (1934).
provides, however, that when an appeal is taken at the time
judgment is rendered, the accused shall, unless let to bail, be
committed to jail by the court. When an appeal is taken sub-
sequent to the entry of the judgment of conviction, the judge
shall enter the allowance of the appeal on the warrant and
may admit the accused to bail. In actual practice, verbal recog-
nizance is sometimes accepted. Frequently the recognizance
section of the appeal warrant is left entirely blank. This may
indicate that a separate appearance bond has been issued by a
justice of the peace. In other cases the surety blank is left in-
complete or the word "cash" is written in. The judge may also
allow a poor and uneducated defendant to deposit title to his
realty in the court, although this is of dubious value other than
the in terrorem effect on the defendant. In taking such a pocket
deed of trust, justices of the peace are advised to check the tax
records on the property.
E. The Record on Appeal
The record on appeal of civil cases consists of the original
warrant or warrants or other notices or pleadings with the
judgment endorsed thereon, together with all pleadings, ex-
hibits and other papers filed in the trial of the case, and the
bond48. Inferably, the same is true for appeal of criminal
cases. The record is of critical importance on appeal. This is
especially true in criminal cases, since the Code allows for no
correction of defects in the record of criminal cases once ap-
pealed. The following two cases are illustrative of the difficulty
encountered:
1. In Sisk v. Town of Shenandoah49 , the appellant was
convicted of a violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting
persons from driving motor vehicles while intoxicated. Since
county courts may take judicial notice of the existence of ordi-
nances of municipalities and counties within their own terri-
torial jurisdiction, no copy of the ordinance was incorporated
in the record. However, a court of record may not take judicial
notice of the ordinance. Section 8-270 provides that a copy
48 Va. Code, § 16.1-112 (1950).
49 200 Va. 277, 105 SX.2d 169 (1958).
of any ordinance of any municipal corporation in this State
may be received as prima facie evidence of the ordinance. This
provision negatives the authority of a circuit court to take
judicial notice of town ordinances on appeal from courts not
of record. Since in this case there was nothing in the record
to show the provisions of the ordinance, the conviction was
reversed and the case dismissed.
2. In Peak v. Virginia"°, the defendant, Peak, was prose-
cuted upon a warrant charging him with operating a liquor
nuisance. The police justice found him guilty but in endorsing
the judgment on the warrant, erroneously stated that the de-
fendant ". . . is hereby dismissed of the within charge and is
sentenced to 30 days in jail, and fined $100." The defendant
appealed. No one noticed that "dismissed" had been written
on the warrant in place of "convicted" until after the judg-
ment of the police court would have become final. It was held
that "dismissed" means acquitted and since the record conclu-
sively shows that the defendant was acquitted, and as only
he may appeal, it is immaterial that a trial before the corpora-
tion court is a trial de novo. There is no way to correct the
error after judgment becomes final. Consent cannot give the
Corporation Court jurisdiction.
These cases clearly reveal the need for statutory provisions
allowing more liberal amendment of the record on appeal.
Until such statutes have been passed it is suggested that the
need may be partially bridged by use of the nunc pro tunc
order51.
F. Who May Appeal
Either party may appeal a civil case. In any case involving
the violation of a law relating to State revenue tried in a court
not of record the Commonwealth shall also have the right to
50 171 Va. 535, 199 S.E. 473 (1938). Although this case was appealed from
a police court to a corporation court, the result would be the same on
appeal from a court not of record.
51 See 1 W. & M. L. Rev. 1, p. 135, Coancil v. Commonwealth-Nunc Pro
Tunc Orders In Virginia (1957).
appeal to the circuit court of the county or the corporation or
hustings court of the corporation as the case may be52.
In criminal cases any person convicted in a court not of
record of an offense not feloneous shall have the right to ap-
peal any time within ten days from such conviction regardless
of whether such conviction was upon a plea of guilty. There
shall also be an appeal of right by any party from any order
or judgment of a court not of record forfeiting any recognizance
or revoking any suspension of sentence53. Courts not of record
have no authority to try felonies so naturally there is no pro-
vision for appeal therefrom.
G. Trial of Appealed Cases
1. Civil Cases
Section 16.1-113 provides that appeals shall be tried in
a summary way by the court of record except that either party
may demand a jury trial when the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds fifty dollars. This section also provides for the de novo
nature of the trial by specifically stating that all legal evidence
shall be heard regardless of whether or not it was produced
in the court not of record.
In general the procedure contained in Part Three of the
Rules of Court shall govern the trial of appealed cases in courts
of record.
2. Criminal Cases
Appeal of criminal cases shall be heard de novo in the
court of record and shall be tried without formal pleadings
in writing; and, except in the case of an appeal from any order
or judgment of a court not of record forfeiting any recognizance
or revoking any suspension of sentence, the accused shall be
entitled to trial by jury"'. The judge of the appellate court
may amend any defective warrant or issue a new warrant.
52 Va. Code, § 16.1-134 (1950).
53 Va. Code, § 16.1-132 (1950).
54 Va. Code, § 16.1-136 (1950).
Should this be effected after any evidence has been heard, the
accused shall be entitled to a continuance as a matter of right " .
H. Effect of Appeal
1. When Perfected
An appeal, properly perfected, operates not only to sus-
pend the judgment of the inferior tribunal, but also vacates
and sets it aside, so that it cannot be used as evidence or as
the foundation of an action in any court. The appeal not only
annuls the judgment of the county court, but it is reversible
error to permit such judgment to be introduced in evidence
before the jury5".
In Addison v. Salyer57 , the decision on appeal was to re-
verse and dismiss. Reversal and dismissal are incompatible.
Dismissal alone would have been a sufficient and proper de-
cision, making the lower court decision void ab initio. Tech-
nically it is incorrect to speak of a judgment of reversal on
appeal where the effect of the appeal is to vacate the judgment
of the inferior tribunal for the reason that there is nothing to
reverse. However, the Virginia Code persists in using the term
"'reversed" as a convenient method of stating the appeal de-
cision. Thus it is provided that if the lower court decision be
reversed upon appeal, the party substantially prevailing shall
recover his costs; and such order or judgment shall be made or
given as ought to have been made or given by the judge of
the lower court" .
In criminal cases, the appeal wipes out a former plea of
guilty entered before a county court. Such plea is not admissible
in the circuit court as "a confession." The accused is given an
opportunity and must plead anew in the court of record for
55 Va. Code, §16.1-137 (1950).
5 6Gravely v. Deeds, 185 Va. 662, 40 S.E.2d 175 (1946); Baylor v. Comm.,
190 Va. 116, 56 S.E.2d 77 (1949).
57 185 Va. 644, 40 S.E.2d 260 (1946).
S8 Va. Code, § 16.1-113 (1950).
unless he does so he could not be tried by a jury in the same
manner as if he had been indicted for the offense in said court 9.
Where the constitutionality of the statute is not questioned,
the judgment of the corporation court, upon an appeal from
the decision of a court not of record, is final in a case to re-
cover back tax money paid under protest after a tender and
refusal of coupons" .
2. When Not Perfected
Until an appeal is perfected, the judgment of the inferior
court is not vacated but remains in full force. In such case
the judgment of the court not of record shall be satisfied from
the appeal bond 1. It follows that when an appeal from a
court not of record is improvidently awarded by a circuit court,
and the jurisdiction thereof is challenged in the State Supreme
Court of Appeals, the judgment of the court not of record
should be regarded as having been vacated conditionally and
on dismissal of the appeal, is reinstated. Similarly, if the ap-
pellant fails to pay the writ tax and costs, the appeal shall be
dismissed and the judgment of the lower court shall become
final 2.
III. Recommendations
The following recommendations are offered to improve
the present system of practice and procedure in the lower courts
of Virginia:
1. That present removal sections 16.1-72, 16.1-92,
16.1-105 and 16.1-122 be amended to clearly show the pur-
pose of removal and on what grounds it may be granted.
59 Baylor v. Comm., 190 Va. 116,56 S.E.2c1 77 (1949).
00 Bransford v. Karn, 87 Va. 242, 12 S.E. 404 (1890).
01 Va. Code, § 16.1-107 (1950).
02 Va. Code, § 16.1-112 (1950).
2. That appeal sections 16.1-73, 16.1-106, 16.1-113 and
16.1-136 be amended to provide for a trial de novo without
the present jurisdictional limitation.
a. That in particular, jurisdiction both as to subject
matter and amount of cross-claim, and amended
claim no longer be limited by the jurisdiction of the
court not of record from which appealed.
b. Further that these sections be amended to show
specifically when an appeal shall be deemed per-
fected.
3. That appeal sections 16.1-73, 16.1-113 and 16.1-136
be amended to provide for liberal correction of purely clerical
errors, errors or omissions in the record, etc.
a. That the amended statutes provide that these cor-
rections may be made on motion of either party
by the judge to the end that substantial justice
prevail.
4. That section 16.1-77(2) be amended to show that
jurisdiction to try attachment cases is limited to those cases
dealing with personality.
5. That a statute be enacted to provide for withdrawal
of removal actions any time before trial in the court of record.
Such withdrawal shall be granted by the judge or clerk of
the court of record upon written application and payment of
costs.
6. That a statute be enacted specifically stating that a
corporate seal is not necessary on an appeal bond.
